




# Secretary problem: Towards better bounds with ML advice

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#### Introduction to secretary problem

- ► A selection problem:
  - Committing to a choice before knowing all possibilites
  - Examples:
    - Finding love of you life! (ted.com/talks/hannah\_fry\_the\_mathematics\_of\_love)
    - Choosing toilet at a concert! (youtube.com/watch?v=ZWib5olGbQ0)
    - Finding a student for PostDoc (vanderbei.princeton.edu/tex/PostdocProblem/PostdocProb.pdf)
    - Finding the best house: (davidwees.com/content/how-i-used-mathematicschoose-my-next-apartment/)





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- Basics:
  - Given *n* candidates with previously unknown values  $v_1, \dots, v_n \in \mathcal{R}$
  - The value of candidates is reveled in the same order
  - After seeing the *i*-th candidate, you either accept it or reject it





# **Possible goals**

- Maximizing the probability of choosing the best possible candidate
  - Original Problem
- Maximizing the probability of choosing second best candidate
  - Postdoc problem
- Maximizing the expected value of chosen candidate
  - Value maximization variation
  - Any α-approximation for the classical secretary problem yields an αapproximation for the value-maximization variant.
- K-secretary problem
  - Maximizing sum, application in online auction (Kleinberg, SODA 2005)
  - Graphic matroid: select a subset of edges of maximum weight under the constraint that this subset is a forest (Kleinberg et. al., SODA 2007)





# **Possible arrival model**

- Adversarial:
  - No deterministic algorithm better than 0-competitive
  - Randomized algorithm
    - There is  $\frac{1}{n}$  -randomized algorithm (for both expected cost and best candidate)
    - No randomized algorithm can do better than  $\frac{1}{n}$  (Based on Yao's principle)
- Random arrival:
  - There is an algorithm that selects the maximum with probability  $\frac{1}{e}$
- Non-uniform arrival:
  - We can still approach  $\frac{1}{e}$  (Kleinberg et. al., STOC 2015)





# Yao's principle

Let A be a random variable with values in class of all deterministic algorithms A', and let X be a random variable with values in class of all instances X', and g as a gain function.

► Then:

$$\min_{x \in \mathcal{X}'} \mathbb{E}[g(A, x)] \le \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}'} \mathbb{E}[g(a, X)]$$

► Proof:





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Proof:

- $E[g(a,X)] = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}'} P[X = x]g(a,x), E[g(A,x)] = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}'} P[A = a]g(a,x)$
- The weighted average is upper-bounded by its maximum value, and vice versa
  - $-\min_{x\in\mathcal{X}'} \mathbb{E}[g(A,x)] \le \sum_{x\in\mathcal{X}'} P[X=x] \sum_{a\in\mathcal{A}'} P[A=a] g(a,x)$
  - $-\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}'} P[A = a] \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}'} P[X = x] g(a, x) \le \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}'} E[g(a, X)]$





#### **Choosing best candidate**

No randomized algorithm guarantees to select the best candidate with probability more than  $\frac{1}{n}$ .





## **Choosing best candidate**

- No randomized algorithm guarantees to select the best candidate with probability more than  $\frac{1}{n}$ .
  - Define gain function as indicator random function based on selecting the best value
  - Based on Yao's principle, it is enough to show that there is a probability distribution over instances *X* such that  $\max_{a \in \mathcal{A}'} E[g(a, X)] = \frac{1}{n}$
  - Fix an arbtriary algorithm a, and assume  $x^{(t)} = (1, 2, ..., t, 0, ..., 0)$
  - Let T be drawn uniformly at random from 1, ..., n and set  $X = x^{(T)}$ .





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  - Fix an arbtriary algorithm a, and assume  $x^{(t)} = (1, 2, ..., t, 0, ..., 0)$
  - Let T be drawn uniformly at random from 1, ..., n and set  $X = x^{(T)}$ .
  - Consider an arbitrary deterministic algorithm *a* on sequence x<sup>(n)</sup>
    = (1,2 ..., n), and selection s.
  - For another sequence:
    - if,  $s \le t$ , then the algorithm will make exactly the same decisions because sequences  $x^{(t)}$  and  $x^{(n)}$  look the same until position t.
    - If s > t, then the algorithm selects 0.

$$E[g(a, X)] = E[g(a, x^{(t)})] = \Pr(s = t) = \frac{1}{n}$$





#### **Getting maximum expected value**

▶ No randomized algorithm give us higher value than  $\frac{1}{n}OPT$ .





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- Proof by contradiction, assume an algorithm with ratio  $\frac{1}{n} + \epsilon$
- Set  $M = \frac{2}{\epsilon}$
- Assume  $x^{(t)} = (1, M, M^2, ..., M^t, 0, ... 0)$
- Let  $v^*$  denote the maximum value given by this sequence, our algorithm either selects it or otherwise the cost is at most  $\frac{v^*}{M}$
- $v^*(\frac{1}{n} + \epsilon) \le E[v(ALG)] \le v^* \Pr[A \text{ selects maximum element}] + \frac{v^*}{M}$
- $\frac{1}{n} + \epsilon \frac{\epsilon}{2} \le \Pr[A \text{ selects maximum element}] \rightarrow \text{contradiction} \bigcirc$





### The old algorithm for random arrival model

Algorithm: Say no to the first  $\frac{n}{x}$  candidates, then select the one which has better value than the first  $\frac{n}{x}$  candidates.





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- Algorithm: Say no to the first  $\frac{n}{x}$  candidates, then select the one which has better value than the first  $\frac{n}{x}$  candidates
  - Proof: Let us define probability  $p_i$  of the *i*-th candidate be in the first segment, and the best one is before the (i 1) good ones in the second segment.

 $p_i = p[i \text{ in the first segment}].$ p[i-1 in the second segment|i in the first segment]. $p[i-2 \text{ in the second segment}|i \text{ in first}, i-1 \text{ in second segment}] \dots$ p[best candidate before i - 2th, ..., 2nd best candidates] $= x \cdot \left( \prod_{i=0}^{i-2} (1-x) \cdot \frac{n}{n-j-1} - \frac{j}{n-j-1} \right) \cdot \frac{1}{i-1}$  $\lim_{n \to \infty} p_i = x \cdot \left( \prod_{i=0}^{i-2} (1-x) \right) \cdot \frac{1}{i-1}$  $p_{success} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{x}{i} (1-x)^i = -x ln(x)$ Maximizes for  $x = \frac{1}{a}$ 





- ▶ Predicting the maximum value,  $g^*$
- $\triangleright \lambda$  is the confidence of the predictions
- c describes to lose in the worst case
- $\exp\{W_{-1}(-1/(ce))\}$  and  $\exp\{W_0(-1/(ce))\}$  are solution to  $-x\ln(x)$ =  $\frac{1}{ce}$

ALGORITHM 1: Value-maximization secretary algorithm Input : Prediction  $p^*$  for (unknown) value max<sub>i</sub>  $v_i$ ; confidence parameter  $0 \le \lambda \le p^*$  and  $c \ge 1$ . Output: Element a. Set v' = 0. Phase I: for  $i = 1, ..., \lfloor \exp\{W_{-1}(-1/(ce))\} \cdot n \rfloor$  do Set  $v' = \max\{v', v_i\}$ end Set  $t = \max\{v', p^* - \lambda\}$ . Phase II: for  $i = |\exp\{W_{-1}(-1/(ce))\} \cdot n| + 1, \dots, |\exp\{W_0(-1/(ce))\} \cdot n|$  do if  $v_i > t$  then Select element a<sub>i</sub> and STOP. end end Set  $t = \max\{v_j : j \in \{1, ..., \lfloor \exp(W_0(-1/(ce))) \cdot n \rfloor\}\}$ . Phase III: for  $i = |\exp\{W_0(-1/(ce))\} \cdot n| + 1, ..., n$  do if  $v_i > t$  then Select element a<sub>i</sub> and STOP. end end





▶ Theorem, Algorithm is  $g_{c,\lambda}(\eta) - competive$ , where  $g_{c,\lambda}(\eta)$  is:

$$g_{c,\lambda}(\eta) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \max\left\{\frac{1}{ce}, \left[f(c)\left(\max\left\{1-\frac{\lambda+\eta}{OPT}, 0\right\}\right)\right]\right\} & \text{if } 0 \le \eta < \lambda \\ \frac{1}{ce} & \text{if } \eta \ge \lambda \end{array} \right\}$$

And f(c) is:

$$f(c) = \exp\{W_0(-1/(ce))\} - \exp\{W_{-1}(-1/(ce))\}.$$





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▶ Proof: In the worst-case we are always  $\frac{1}{ce}$ -competitive:

- $p^* \lambda > OPT$ : Never goes to step two, similar to previous proof
- p<sup>\*</sup> − λ ≤ OPT: estimation was not higher than opt, then from the fact answer, and any α-approximation for the classical secretary problem yields an α-approximation for the value-maximization variant.





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- ▶ When the error is low, then:
- P<sup>\*</sup> > OPT: we have g<sup>\*</sup> − λ < OPT, Since OPT appears in Phase II with probability f(c), we in particular pick some element in Phase II with value at least OP T − λ with probability f(c).
- With probability f(c) we will pick some element with value at least  $OPT \lambda \eta$ . To see this, note that in the worst case we would have  $g^* = OPT \eta$ , and we could select an element with value  $g^* \lambda$ , which means that the value of the selected item is OP T  $\lambda \eta$ .





# Thank you 🙂





